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Abstract 
Although memory for actual events tends to be forgotten over time, memory for 
misinformation tends to be retrieved at a stable rate over long delays or at a rate greater than that 
found immediately after encoding. To examine whether source monitoring errors contribute to 
this phenomenon, two experiments investigated subjects’ memory for the source of 
misinformation at different retention intervals. Subjects viewed a slide presentation, read a 
narrative containing misinformation, and, either 10 minutes or 1 week later, completed a 
recognition test about details seen in the slides and about the source of these details. After the 
longer retention interval in both experiments, participants were more likely to agree that they had 
seen misleading information and were also more likely to incorrectly associate the 
misinformation with the slide event. Theoretical implications of these findings are considered. 
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Why misinformation is more likely to be recognised over time:  
A source monitoring account 
Researchers investigating eyewitness memory have long found that participants retrieve 
poste-vent misinformation, even when asked to remember only what was seen during an 
eye-witness episode (Belli, 1989; Frost & Weaver, 1997; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978; 
McCloskey& Zaragoza, 1985; Weingart, Loftus, & Lindsay, 1995). What makes this 
“misinformation effect” even more problematic is that recent evidence suggests that memory for 
misinformation appears to be more resistant to forgetting than memory for actual details of an 
eyewitness event. Some research has shown that, after relatively long delays, misinformation 
tends to be recalled and recognised at a rate similar or greater than immediately after exposure to 
misinformation (Frost, 2000; Underwood & Pezdek, 1998). Underwood and Pezdek (1998), for 
instance, found that participants tend to recognise more misinformation after a 1-month retention 
interval under certain conditions. Participants first viewed slides – the simulated eyewitness 
event – depicting a young woman baking a cake, and another set of slides depicting a man 
surveying a construction site. Participants then read two narratives, each describing one of the 
slide sets. Each narrative contained misinformation that contradicted details seen in the slides. 
Participants were told that the narrative was either attributed to a low-credibility source – a 4-
year-old boy – or a high-credibility source – a memory psychologist. Participants then answered 
a yes/no recognition test about details in the slides. After a 1-month delay between the time of 
reading the narrative and test, participants tended to recognise more mis-information than after a 
10-minute delay, especially in the low-credibility condition.  
To explain this finding, Underwood and Pezdek apply a hypothesis associated with 
communication effectiveness, called the availability-valence hypothesis. According to this 
hypothesis, people tend to rate the message from a low-credibility source as more effective over 
time because the message and its source become less strongly associated after long delays 
(Hoveland, Lumsdaine, & Sheffield, 1949; Mazursky & Shul, 1987). At short delays however, 
participants remember the low-credibility source is associated with the message (or 
misinformation), so they are hesitant to judge the message as effective. Applied to the 
misinformation paradigm, this term could be taken to mean that people will tend to falsely 
recognise misinformation as true over long peri-ods of time. The underlying assumption is that, 
although misinformation may remain familiar over time – enough to be recognised – memory for 
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the source of the misinformation will deteriorate to the extent that a participant will more likely 
accept it as having been from the eyewitness event.  
The availability-valence hypothesis is a variant of what is more generally referred to as 
source monitoring errors (Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Lindsay, 1990). According to 
this account, every memory, including memory for misinformation, has a source that is decided 
upon by the witness at the time of retrieval. Misinformation is sometimes recognised because the 
source of misinformation is confused as being from the eyewitness event (Belli, Lindsay, Gales, 
& McCarthy, 1994; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  
Furthermore, Johnson et al. (1993) claim that the more characteristics the memory for 
misinformation has in common with the memory for the event, the more likely it is the 
participant will confuse the source of misinformation as being from the event. Retention time, for 
instance, will play an important role in how similar the details of a memory for misinformation 
will be relative to the memory for the event. Over a short delay, it is more obvious that the 
memory for the verbal misinformation does not have some of the perceptual characteristics of the 
pictorial eyewitness event, leading to a greater likelihood that the participant will not accept 
misinformation as being from the event. However, as the memory for the pictorial event loses its 
perceptual details over time, it becomes more comparable to the memory of misinformation in 
regard to the quantity of details associated with it, making source mon-itoring errors more likely. 
To become more comparable with real memory, it is unlikely that memory for misinformation 
gains more perceptual details over time; misled and real memories are eventually more likely to 
be confused because of a mutual lack of details that arise as time progresses. After a long delay, 
the source mis-attribution account predicts that participants would be less hesitant to recognize 
misinformation as being from the event, thus offering a possible account for the increased 
misinformation effects over time found in Frost (2000) and Underwood and Pezdek (1998).  
As predicted by the source monitoring account, studies that have included a relatively 
short delay have shown that participants tend to correctly attribute misinformation to the 
narrative rather than to an event depicted on slides (Lindsay & Johnson, 1989; Zaragoza & 
Koshmider, 1989). If, however, participants are encouraged to mentally reconstruct the original 
event or visualise misleading details – thereby adding visual details to the misinformation – 
source monitoring errors become more likely, even after relatively short delays (Durso & 
Johnson, 1980; Zaragoza & Lane, 1994).  
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To our knowledge, no one has assessed memory for source in a misinformation paradigm 
while varying retention time within a single experiment. If source monitoring errors contribute to 
increased misinformation effects over time, then memory for source should be particularly poor 
for misled memory after a long delay while mis-information recognition performance remains 
steady or increases over the interval. In the following two experiments, recognition memory for 
misinformation and its source was measured at different retention intervals (10 minutes and 1 
week).  
 
Experiments 1 and 2 
As Experiments 1 and 2 involved virtually the same procedures, the methodology and 
results of these experiments will be described together. The only difference between experiments 
was that participants in Experiment 2 were told that some information read in a narrative 
(containing misinformation) was inconsistent with what was seen in a slide presentation, whereas 
participants in Experiment 1 did not receive this instruction. This variation in procedure was 
included to avoid demand characteristics. For instance, participants might appear to misattribute 
misleading details to the eyewitness event not because of source monitoring confusion, but 
because participants trusted that misleading details read about in the narrative were in the 
original event. Although they might know that misleading details were from the narrative, they 
infer that the narrative contained correct information about the event. By instructing participants 
that some of the information in the narrative was inconsistent with the event, the tendency to 
assume narrative items were in the event is avoided. This approach has been referred to as the 
logic of opposites (Lindsay, 1990).  
 
 Method 
Participants. Each experiment included 48 undergraduate students from Rivier College in 
Nashua, New Hampshire. Participants were offered extra credit to volunteer in the experiments. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a 10-minute or 1-week delay condition, with 24 
participants in each condition.  
Materials. A total of 46 slides were presented (a subset from McCloskey & Zaragoza, 
1985). These slides portray an incident in an office where a maintenance man steals 20 dollars 
and a calculator. Four details, each seen in a separate slide, were critical details. One of two 
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versions of each critical detail was presented at a particular session: An initial on a mug (“L” or 
“M”), a soft-drink can (Coca-Cola or Sunkist), a magazine (Glamour or Vogue), and a tool 
(hammer or wrench). During each experiment session, two control critical details were not later 
associated with misinformation while the two remaining critical details were associated with 
misinformation in a subsequent narrative. Each version of the critical details was 
counterbalanced in such a way as to ensure that each version served as control details and details 
associated with misinformation an equal number of times.  
Participants read a narrative describing two misinformation details that contradicted two 
cri-tical details seen in the slides. For instance, the narrative might mention that the maintenance 
man pulled out a hammer (misinformation detail) from the toolbox, when, actually, a wrench 
(critical detail) was shown in the slides. The narrative included 26 sentences detailing the 
incident in the slides.  
A yes/no test similar to that used by Underwood and Pezdek (1998) was administered 
after the narrative. Each of the four critical details was assessed by three yes/no questions, 
referring to the slide details, misinformation details, and foil details. Serving as a baseline, foil 
details were those details that were neither in the slide nor the narrative. Participants were asked 
to circle yes or no to questions that took the following form: “Did the man place the keys next to 
a Coca-Cola can, yes or no?” Participants were asked not to circle yes or no if they did not 
remember the answer.  
Each question about slide, misleading, and foil items was also followed by two questions 
about the source of the detail. Questions took the fol-lowing form: “Did you see the Coca-Cola 
can in the slide event, yes or no?” Another question asked, “Did you see the Coca-Cola can in 
the narrative, yes or no?” Again, participants were instructed not to circle yes or no if they did 
not know the answer.  
Procedure. Participants viewed slides at a rate of 5 seconds each. After the slide 
presentation was completed, participants worked on a crossword puzzle, used as a filler task, for 
5 minutes. They then read the narrative at their own pace. After the narrative, participants 
completed the yes/no recognition test either 10 minutes or 1 week after they had started reading 
the narrative. Retention interval was varied between subjects. After participants in the 10-minute 
condition finished reading the narrative, they were again provided with a filler task (crossword 
puzzle). After participants in the 1-week condition finished reading the narrative, they were 
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asked not to discuss the experiments with anyone until the next experimental session. After the 
10-minute or 1-week delay, participants were given the yes/no recognition test with instructions 
to circle yes for details recognized from the slides. In regard to answering questions about the 
source of the items, participants were told that they could indicate that details were seen in both 
the slides and the narrative. In Experiment 2, participants were informed just before 
administration of the test that some information in the narrative was inconsistent with details 
shown in the slides. When the experiment was completed, participants were debriefed.  
 
TABLE 1 
Proportion of "yes" responses to details as a function of 
experiment, retention interval,  
and condition 
    
 
  Question type   
    Delay/ 
Condition  
Misleading 
details 
Slide 
details 
Foil 
detail 
Experiment 1 
   10-Minutes  
      Control  .04 .70 .09 
   Misled .30 .46 .13 
    1-Week 
      Control  .04 .58 .13 
   Misled .38 .33 .16 
    Experiment 2 
   10-Minutes  
      Control  .02 .64 .04 
   Misled .25 .45 .05 
    1-Week 
      Control  .00 .55 .07 
   Misled .35 .28 .07 
        
      10-minutes and 1-week refer to the retention times between the start of 
the narrative phase and the start of the recognition test phase. 
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Results and discussion  
Table 1 shows the proportion of “yes” responses to the question types (i.e., questions 
about mis-leading, slide, and foil details) as a function of Experiment (Experiments 1 and 2), 
retention interval (10 minutes and 1 week), and condition (misled and control). The effects of 
each of the three details were analysed separately, using a 2 (retention interval: 10 min or 1 day) 
x2 (condition: misled or control) mixed factorial analysis of variance (ANOVA). ANOVAs were 
conducted for Experiment 1 (F1) and for Experiment 2 (F2). All analyses in both experiments 
were set at alpha equal to .05.  
Participants' responses to misleading details across condition and retention interval were 
analysed. Participants were more likely to recognise misleading details in the misled condition 
than in the control condition.1 The main effect of condition was significant, F1(1,44) = 13.54, 
MSE = 2.24 and F2(1,44) = 19.29,MSE = 3.13.The main effect of retention interval was also 
significant, F1(1,44) = 4.86, MSE = 2.24 and F2(1, 44) = 6.16, MSE = 3.13, with more 
misleading details being recognised over the delay. An interaction between condition and 
retention interval did not occur, F1(1, 44) = 0.25, MSE = 2.24 and F2(1,44) = 0.15, MSE = 3.13.  
Slide details and foil details were also analysed separately using a 2 (retention interval) x 
2 (condition) mixed ANOVA. For slide details, only the main effects for condition, F1(1,44) = 
11.86, MSE = 2.23 and F2(1, 44) = 9.89, MSE = 2.73, and retention interval, F1(1, 44) = 9.99, 
MSE = 2.23 and F2(1,44) = 8.39, MSE = 2.73, were significant. An interaction between 
condition and retention interval did not occur when slide details were analysed, F1(1, 44) = 0.77, 
MSE = 2.23 and F2(1, 44) = 0.57, MSE = 2.73. For foil details, no main effects were found for 
condition, F1(1, 44) = 0.21, MSE =1.86 and F2(1,44) = 0.13, MSE = 1.08, nor for time, F1(1,44) 
= 0.75, MSE = 1.86 and F2(1, 44) = 1.08,MSE = 1.08. An interaction between condition and 
retention interval did not occur when foil items were analysed, F1(1, 44) = 0.14, MSE = 1.86 and 
F2(1, 44)= 0.18, MSE = 1.08.  
                                                          
1 A misleading detail in the control condition referred to a detail that would have been 
used to contradict the critical detail as misinformation in other conditions. Retrieval of these 
items served as a baseline. 
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To examine whether the resulting misinformation effect was due to guessing and whether 
there was an increase in the recognition of misleading details relative to foil details over time, the 
pro-portion of yes responses to misleading and foil details was compared in the misled condition 
after the different delays using a 2 (question type: misleading or foil detail) x 2 (time: 10 minutes 
or 1 week) mixed ANOVA. Considering details in the misled conditions, the main effect for 
question type was significant, with the proportion of recognized foil details (.15 in Experiment 1 
and .12 in Experiment 2) significantly lower than the proportion of recognized misleading details 
(.34 in Experiment 1 and .30 in Experiment 2), F1(1,44) = 26.45, MSE = 1.04 and F2(1, 44) = 
42.45, MSE= 1.82. Therefore, misinformation was recognized at a rate greater than the 
recognition rate associated with mere guessing. An interaction between question type and 
retention interval in the misled conditions was also significant, F1(1, 44) = 2.61, MSE = 1.04 and 
F2(1, 44) = 11.05, MSE = 1.82. While the proportion of misleading details recognised increased 
over the retention interval, the proportion of foil details recognised did not increase over the 
retention interval.  
Table 2 shows the proportion of yes responses to the details and the potential sources of 
those details, broken down by experiment, retention interval, and condition. Participants tended 
to commit more source monitoring errors for both misleading and slide details over time. A main 
effect for time was found when misleading details in the misled conditions were misattributed to 
the slides, F1(1,44) = 19.43,MSE = 2.18 and F2(1, 44) =11.22, MSE = 2.74. A main effect for 
time was also found when slide details in the control conditions were misattributed to the 
narrative, F1(1, 44) = 34.75, MSE = 2.07 and F2(1, 44) = 29.83, MSE = 2.51.  
In regards to misleading details, participants tended to correctly attribute misinformation 
to the narrative after a short delay. Notice that when misleading details were recognised in the 
10-minute, misled condition, participants correctly indicated more often that these details came 
from the narrative rather than the slides, especially when they were told about the inconsistent 
details in Experiment 2. After a week, however, participants in the misled condition were more 
likely to incorrectly indicate that misleading details were from the slide rather than the narrative. 
A different pattern emerged for slide details over time. In the 10-minute, control condition, more 
slides details were indicated as belonging to the slides than to the narrative. While memory for 
the source of the slides also diminished over time, participants were still more likely to correctly 
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TABLE 2 
Proportion of "yes" responses to details (overall) and source of details as a function of 
experiment, retention interval, and condition 
 
Question type 
 
Misleading details Slide details 
Delay/Condition Overall Slide? Narrative? Overall Slide? Narrative? 
Experiment 1 
      10-Minutes  
         Control  .04 .02 .02 .70 .69 .03 
   Misled .30 .11 .19 .46 .44 .06 
       1-Week 
         Control  .04 .03 .03 .58 .37 .30 
   Misled .38 .25 .16 .33 .23 .18 
       Experiment 2 
      10-Minutes  
         Control  .02 .02 .00 .64 .64 .00 
   Misled .25 .08 .17 .45 .43 .02 
       1-Week 
         Control  .00 .00 .00 .55 .35 .22 
   Misled .35 .22 .17 .28 .18 .14 
           In some instances the sum of the proportion of yes responses to slide and narrative sources does not equal 
the overall proportion. This is because subjects could – and in some cases did – say yes to both slide and 
narrative sources. 
 
attribute the slide details to the slides than to the narrative after a 1-week interval. Source 
mon-itoring errors were less likely to occur for slide details after a delay than for misleading 
details.  
 
General Discussion 
 These experiments replicate the finding that memory for misinformation tends to be 
retrieved with greater frequency over time than memory for actual event details (Frost, 2000; 
Underwood & Pezdek,1998).The findings of these experiments also revealed that participants 
committed more source monitoring errors relative to correct source attributions for misleading 
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details after a 1-week retention interval, whereas participants were more likely to correctly 
attribute slide details to the slides at both short and long intervals.  
In Experiment 2, participants were told that there was some information in the narrative 
that was inconsistent with details seen in the slides. Despite this warning, participants still tended 
to misattribute misleading details to the slides more often than they correctly attributed the 
mis-information to the narrative after the 1-week delay. Because participants knew about the 
inconsistencies in the narrative, it is unlikely that participants merely appeared to misattribute 
misleading details to the slides because they inferred that the narrative was an entirely accu-rate 
account of what occurred in the slides. More likely, participants experienced genuine source 
confusions.  
Consistent with Lindsay and Johnson (1989) and Zaragoza and Koshmider (1989), 
participants were more likely to correctly attribute misinformation to the narrative after a short 
delay. Control details also tended to be correctly attributed to their source, the slides, after a short 
delay.  
The tendency for participants to correctly identify the source of misinformation and 
actual event details after a short delay was consistent with source monitoring accounts. The 
availability-valence account would predict that, after a brief delay, participants would still have 
in mind a strong association between the details seen and read and their sources, preventing 
source confusions. The findings over the short delay are also consistent with predictions made by 
Johnson et al. (1993), especially as the recent encoding of the event would maintain much of its 
perceptual detail in memory. The newly encoded verbal misinformation would lack the 
perceptual details of the event, thus preventing the participant from being inclined to recognize 
the misinformation as being from the slides.  
The source monitoring error rates for misled and true memories tended to differ after a 
longer retention interval. After the long delay, participants were more likely to incorrectly 
attribute misinformation to the slides, whereas participants continued to correctly attribute slide 
details to the slides after a long delay, although to a lesser extent than after the short delay.  
The finding that participants were more likely to confuse misinformation as belonging to 
the eyewitness event over time is consistent with source monitoring accounts. According to the 
availability-valence hypothesis, it is after the long retention interval that the association between 
the items and their sources breaks down, and participants are more likely to confuse 
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misinformation as having been seen in the slides. This finding is also consistent with the 
predictions of Johnson et al. (1993) because it is after a delay that memory for misinformation 
becomes more comparable to the event memory in terms of the quantity of perceptual details, 
making source monitoring errors of misinformation to the slides more likely.  
What source monitoring hypotheses do not account for, however, is the fact that, after a 
relatively long delay, the majority of source attributions to misinformation were incorrect, 
whereas the majority of source attributions to event details were correct. Is this because 
participants are more motivated to attribute details to the eyewitness event, even after the 
memory for source becomes vague? Or is it because memory for misinformation is truly more 
susceptible to source confusions than memory for actual event details? Future research will need 
to examine the mechanism(s) behind this particular finding.  
Source monitoring accounts do offer reasons why people are more inclined to retrieve 
misinformation over time. After a delay, more misinformation is likely selected because the 
source of misinformation becomes lost in memory in many cases. Misinformation that the 
eyewitness initially hesitated to recognise remains familiar after a long delay, but loses its 
association with its source and is more comparable to the eyewitness episode in terms of its lack 
of details.  
 
 Conclusion and implications 
Although past studies have not specifically focused on the phenomenon of increased 
recognition of misled memories over time, this study, taken together with the results of Frost 
(2000) and Underwood and Pezdek (1998), suggests that this is a fairly robust phenomenon 
worthy of more attention. It is also clear that source monitoring errors, more frequent after 
relatively long retention intervals, may be linked to an increase in the recognition of 
misinformation overtime. Investigations can now focus on why memory for misinformation is 
especially susceptible to source confusions compared with accurate memories after a delay. 
Given the abundance of information people encounter today, it is important to confirm the 
legitimacy of the source of information when it is based on long-term memory.  
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